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Management by Exception? The Taylor Review and workforce management 
Sian Moore (S.Moore@greenwich.ac.uk; University of Greenwich) and Kirsty Newsome 
(k.j.newsome@sheffield.ac.uk; University of Sheffield) 
 
Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices champions work flexibility 
defined in terms of worker preference or choice (referred to as ‘the British way’).  Emphasis 
throughout the report is placed upon the necessity for the UK to ‘encourage flexible work’, 
highlighting the virtues for both employers and employees. Indeed, flexible working, the 
review claims, has a positive impact on productivity, worker retention and the overall quality 
of work.  In this commentary we draw on research evidence from workers on non-standard 
contracts to question these claims. We interrogate the notion of worker preference for 
flexible work (or non-standard contracts) by focussing on two key areas highlighted in the 
report, autonomy over working time and work-life balance. In doing so we expose the way 
that the Taylor Review’s narrative and aspirations for good work ultimately vindicates labour 
market segregation and fails to fully comprehend the power dynamics at play in the 
contemporary workplace. Our evidence reflects how structural processes constrain labour 
market participation. With a view to the focus of this journal we also explore the role of 
technology in extending the management prerogative over workers on non-standard 
contracts, thereby regulating fragmented, episodic and desynchronised work.  In particular 
we consider the use of Workforce Management Software, focussing upon two sectors with 
large numbers of workers on non-standard contracts: electronic monitoring in homecare and 
GPS technology and algorithms in logistics and parcel delivery.   
 
According to the Taylor Review, it is particular groups within the labour market, ‘carers, 
women, those with disabilities and older workers’ who choose flexibility as the basis of their 
labour market participation ‘enabling them to balance work around other priorities’ 
(2017:15). The Review promotes job design, but the inclusion of women as a homogenous 
and undifferentiated category flies in the face of decades of gender equality legislation and 
organisational practice that has aimed to facilitate work-life balance for both female and male 
workers. The inclusion of disabled workers similarly shifts the onus from employers to make 
reasonable adjustments onto the individual worker to adapt to organisational demands as a 
‘trade-off’ for labour market participation. The celebration of worker preference means that 
the Taylor Review can evade the possibility of discrimination at the levels of the organisation 
and labour market (beyond a discussion of organisational discrimination on the basis of 
maternity). 
   
The Taylor Review asserts that ‘people look for work that suits their individual lifestyles and 
preferences’ (2017:28) which casts flexible work as preference. Our research refutes the 
notion of ‘choice’ and provides evidence of the pressures experienced at work from one-sided 
flexibility and simultaneously at home with escalating hardship resulting from low paid, 
episodic and unpredictable work. Research for the Low Pay Commission based on interviews 
with 36 workers in the retail, social care, delivery, hotels, sports and leisure, and security 
sectors in London, South Yorkshire and the South West found little evidence that flexibility 
provides autonomy or work-life balance (Moore et al., 2017). Such work is characterised by 
non-standard contracts – zero hours (ZHCs), minimum (guaranteed) hours (MHCs) and bogus 
‘self-employment’. Our research reveals that in the face of unbridled employer power 
workers do not have control over their working time. ZHCs offered flexibility for some 
workers, including students, those with other jobs or those who are looking to supplement 
their pensions. However, worker case studies revealed uncertainty about contractual status 
amongst those on ZHCs and MHCs with variability in hours leading to confusion over 
permanence. Contracted hours bore limited relationship with the actual hours worked by the 
case study workers. Those on MHCs in retail were expected to state their wider availability 
and to ‘flex-up’ as required. Workers on both MHCs and ZHCs were assumed to be available 
to the employer and a number of workers felt that they were continually on-call. Under ZHCs 
and MHCs the scheduling of hours and days of work varied from week to week with shifts 
arranged only days in advance and changed at short notice. On-demand working meant that 
workers could be sent home if there was insufficient work, but also may work extra hours or 
back-to-back shifts to cover for staff shortages. It is this instability that workers found 
problematic. Some of the case study workers wanted more hours and others did not want to 
take on the extra hours if it meant that they could be called upon to work at short notice. As 
the Taylor Review acknowledges, for workers on ZHCs the capacity to be ‘dismissed’ through 
the withdrawal of hours engendered insecurity. Workers expressed fears about rejecting 
work and had a clear understanding of their dependence on the employer. In homecare and 
hotels, workers reported waiting around between visits or shifts engendering ‘episodic work’. 
Amongst both ZHC and MHC workers there was a desire for permanence and more 
predictable hours. In retail MHCs appeared to restrict employment rights to contracted hours 
only, rather than total hours worked.  
The Taylor Review is committed to ‘allowing workers more autonomy over the content and 
pace of their work’ as leading to well-being and productivity (2017:14). For so-called ‘self-
employed’ workers, despite the autonomy that dependent self-employment would appear to 
offer, in all cases, on the criteria adopted in recent Employment Tribunal cases (ET 2016a) 
there were at least some elements of dependence, which would qualify workers for worker 
status.  For so-called self-employed delivery workers logistics technology not only provides 
the capacity to electronically track and trace the movement of goods, but also the movement 
of remote labour. In our sample delivery workers were classified as ‘self-employed’, yet the 
technological surveillance of their work belied this. Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) or Hand-
Held Devices (HHDs) are used throughout all stages of the supply chain; managers are able to 
track on-screen the precise location of parcels in real time through GPS, whilst drivers capture 
customer signatures providing automated proof of delivery for both parcel delivery 
companies and their clients (with phone technology built in to prove delivery in some cases). 
One ‘lifestyle courier’ working from home noted the capacity for surveillance of her own work 
performance through the HHD provided to the couriers to record delivery and challenged her 
‘self-employed’ status: 
 
‘‘We even have compliance officers to make sure that you are using the HHD; “where 
are you?, what are you doing?”.  The HHD is a machine [that] actually shows them 
where you are at any given time and what you’ve done and what you’ve got to do.  I’ve 
had a call before I’d finished my round about a parcel I have delivered in the first hour 
as to where that parcel is because the customer can’t find it.  They’re that close behind 
you into what you’re actually doing. It’s like being on camera all of the time and you 
have constant telephone calls. So no, I don’t feel like I’m self-employed’. 
(Janice,SWLogistics1). 
 
In line with this the Employment Tribunal ruling of November 2016 found that a CitySprint 
bicycle courier should be classed as a worker and entitled to holiday pay, with CitySprint’s 
assertion of couriers as self-employed described as ‘window dressing’ (Employment Tribunal, 
2016b). Here the control exercised by the company, the fact the claimant was tracked by GPS 
technology and wore a company uniform, along with her lack of control over pay, were 
considered germane. She was considered to have no real right to appoint a substitute (to take 
her place when she was not available for work) in practice, with little autonomy over the 
performance of the services performed.  Overall the surveillance of self-employed drivers and 
home couriers through technology, along with the control exercised by the companies 
through depot managers, appears to be consistent with worker status as declared in the 
Employment Tribunal judgements outlined earlier.  
 
The concept of worker’s preference for flexibility was central to Uber’s unsuccessful attempt, 
in October 2018, to overturn the Employment Tribunal decision that confirmed drivers’ status 
as workers. The company stated that defining drivers as workers could deprive them of the 
‘personal flexibility they value’1 – the preference of the Uber drivers taking the case through 
an independent trade union was for worker’s rights. The Taylor Review calls for clarity on 
employment status and consequent changes in the law that provide a test based on the 
extent of control over work – ‘ultimately, if it looks and feels like employment, it should have 
the status and protection of employment’ (2017:36). At the same time, it rejects moving from 
a three tier to a one tier category of employment that would entail the extension of 
employment rights to ‘workers’, on the basis that this fails to reflect the ‘increasing 
casualisation of the labour market’ (2017: 35) – a ‘Gordian knot’ indeed. 
 
The Taylor Review lauds investment in time and effort in good management relationships, 
both between individuals and at a collective level, with workers having ‘a voice’ in the 
workplace (2017:50). However, our research found that under non-standard contracts the 
roles of management and HR may be largely concerned with the scheduling of work and the 
monitoring of working time and performance. The Taylor Review highlights the introduction 
by Tesco of an app through which workers can ‘take control of their work schedules’ to 
manage their hours, overtime, shifts, holidays and leave ‘giving them more opportunities to 
work additional hours at a time and location that suits them’ (2017:93). Following Uber’s 
unsuccessful challenge, one of the claimants suggested that the company was ‘hiding behind 
technology’ in arguing that its app meant that it was merely an agent between drivers and 
passengers2. Our research suggested that technology in the form of workforce management 
software (WFM) is central to contractual differentiation in its ability to regulate 
desynchronised work and can substitute for the costs of supervision and management with 
rotas received through smart phones. In our sample security workers bid for shifts (through a 
smartphone app or online) via an electronic cloud-based workforce management system 
promising employers cost control and the visibility and surveillance of workforces specifically 





within ‘very low-margin’ sectors, generally contracted-out services. WFM systems provide 
worker selection, work scheduling and time and attendance tools linked to payroll functions. 
The systems offer compliance with regulations relating to pay, holidays, pensions and working 
hours specifically for hourly paid staff. In one of the national retail companies in the sample a 
time and attendance system created weekly employee schedules in line with complex time 
and attendance rules. Capturing attendance may be via biometrics or GPS and these systems 
track the real-time locations of workers. 
 
Such systems state that they aim to balance worker preferences with business needs, but 
more blatantly seek to match variable demand to labour availability (including the quality of 
labour in terms of measured performance) - flexible shifts that deliver ‘enough hours at the 
right time.’ Data gathered on the systems are used to predict peak periods of demand and 
one asserts it can match staffing down to 15 minute intervals. Underpinned by labour 
analytics all systems claim to ‘challenge low productivity’ (Taylor Review 2017: 6), but central 
to this are lower labour costs; they claim to protect businesses and contract delivery from 
’margin erosion’, under and over-delivery and inappropriate employee selection.  The 
systems exercise control over the workforce and regulate behaviour – ensuring that workers 
are compliant with attendance times, alerting management when they are not. Digital 
workforce management systems promise ‘management by exception’, only in the event that 
workers do not behave to plan, a function that apparently frees managers to manage the 
business rather than monitor employees. Remote workers in our sample – in delivery, 
homecare and security - reported that they rarely saw a supervisor or manager. WHM 
systems with real-time dashboards and monitoring stations can effectively observe workers 
‘without impacting their day more than is required’.  
 
A key component of WFM systems is the ability to monitor scheduled versus actual service or 
product delivery and, related to this, several workforce management systems claim to 
substantially reduce overtime costs. The use of non-standard contracts can allow employers 
to redefine elements of the working day as ‘non-productive’ time and thus without the remit 
of paid work – technology is used to regulate these boundaries and reconfigure paid and 
unpaid working. This reconfiguration can redefine work in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. In our sample homecare workers reported that integrated computer-telephone 
technology was used to record service user visits. Electronic monitoring tracked the real-time 
location of homecare workers and thus missed, late and over-running visits, but also where 
scheduled visits were cut short. In homecare pay can be on the basis of contact time only 
(where workers are in client’s homes) – with travel time between clients, supervision training 
and staff meetings unpaid (Hayes and Moore, 2016) – meaning care workers may dip below 
the NLW when time and pay are averaged out.  Homecare workers in our sample also 
reported the episodic nature of work, where there is so-called ‘down-time’ or ‘waiting time’ 
during the day where workers may not be able to go home and must wait between visits, 
effectively available to the employer. One recalled that on the most recent Sunday she had 
worked she saw seven clients, the first at 8.00 a.m. and the last between 8.50 and 9.20 p.m. 
Her client contact time over that 13.5-hour period (excluding travel from home to first client 
and back home after last client) was 4.5 hours, with a gap (no contact hours) from 12.30 to 
4.00. Her comment suggests the notion of unpaid availability.  
 
For self-employed delivery workers, pay is on the basis of delivery only. The PDA can be used 
to monitor not only non-deliveries, but also ‘down time’ or apparently unproductive working 
time. This means that delivery workers absorb the costs of non-delivery, but also preparatory 
and route-planning work, sorting, scanning, loading and unloading parcels and administrative 
work connected with delivery, along with responding to customer queries. In addition to GPS 
navigation systems increasingly parcel delivery companies are using telematics technology 
which has the capacity to dictate more effective delivery routes through Satellite Navigation. 
For Levy (2015) such technology abstracts labour from its local and biophysical contexts 
operationalising job performance as a set of metrics governable by remote parties’ orders 
(2015). The use of navigation systems and route planners was starting to remove drivers’ 
discretion to plan their daily routes, effectively constraining their autonomy in the labour 
process, reconfiguring a driver’s pick-ups and drop-offs in real time. As Levy (2015) describes 
for fleet management systems used to track drivers, real-time monitoring removes the ability 
of workers to reconstruct their time, which may be to demonstrate or manufacture 
compliance. EM thus undermines informal worker power as well as their formal autonomy at 
work.  
The dynamics of surveillance of work cannot be severed from the surrounding political and 
economic environment (Zureik 2003). While dependent self-employment is located within 
the political economy of logistics, and ZHCs in homecare in the political economy of care 
under austerity, the national institutional frameworks advocated in the Taylor Review 
promote differential contracts both legally and fiscally (Behring and Harvey, 2015). Non-
standard contracts sustain low margin sectors and supply chains based upon the pay of hourly 
paid workers.  While the Taylor Review warns that ‘employers must not use flexible working 
models simply to reduce costs and must consider the impact on their workforce in terms of 
increased sickness rates and reduced productivity’ (2017:42), there is no recognition that non-
standard contracts are integral to the flexibility they celebrate. Overall, there is little evidence 
that such contracts facilitate the choice or autonomy championed by the Taylor Review, 
rather there is a reification of labour market segregation. Contractual status facilitates 
desynchronized work meeting peak demands with technology regulating attendance and 
behavior and removing unproductive working time from the remit of paid labour. Despite 
emphasis on ‘routes to progress in work’ for those on lower incomes (Taylor Review 2017:6), 
labour market segregation is reproduced and the clear lack of training and career progression 
in flexible jobs reinforces divisions. In delivering a ‘one-sided view of flexibility’ non-standard 
contracts do not meet aspirations for quality jobs that ‘increase participation rates, 
productivity and economic performance’. As such the Review cannot square the circle of 
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